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DOSCHER: THE SECOND CIRCUIT FREES ITSELF FROM ITS PRIOR LOOK THROUGH
APPROACH, FUELING A CIRCUIT SPLIT
By
Peter Nelson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Doscher v. Seaport, the Second Circuit held that the existence of federalquestion jurisdiction over a Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) § 10 petition to vacate turns
on whether the district court would otherwise possess jurisdiction over the underlying
dispute, rather than a “face-of-the-petition” inquiry.1 This new adoption of the look
through approach overturned Greenberg v. Bear, Stearns.2 The Second Circuit
determined that the look through approach applies equally to § 10 and § 4 of the FAA by
extension of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Vaden v. Discover Bank3 (covering motions
to compel arbitration) to vacatur petitions.4 The Second Circuit reasoned that the
jurisdictional context of Vaden, arising from underlying disputes, together with the
practical consequences of failing to extend the look through approach to jurisdictional
inquiries, justifies extending the look through approach to vacatur petitions.5
Furthermore, the congressional intent of a substantive review of arbitral awards,
established in § 10, is satisfied by further application of the look through approach. 6 The
Second Circuit’s position is controversial in light of a Third Circuit case issued eleven
days after the Doscher decision.7 In Goldman v. Citigroup, the Third Circuit held that an
extension of the look through approach to § 10 petitions violates the federal interest in
promoting the enforceability of arbitration agreements.8 The two cases differ in their
interpretation and extension of Vaden, highlighting a need for clarification over the
application of the look through approach to § 10 petitions.
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See Greenberg v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 220 F.3d 22, 24 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that courts may not “look
through” petitions to determine if the underlying dispute involves substantial questions of federal law).
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II.

BACKGROUND

On October 22, 2013, a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) arbitral
panel awarded Drew Doscher nearly $2.3 million against his former employers.9 Doscher
was a former co-head of sales and trading for The Seaport Group, LLC and Sea Port
Securities, LLC (jointly called Seaport). He commenced arbitration against the two
founders of Seaport, his counterpart co-head of sales and three other Respondents.10
Seaport and Doscher are “Associated Persons” under FINRA rules and “engaged in the
investment banking or securities business who [are] directly or indirectly controlled by a
FINRA member” and subsequently bound to arbitration under FINRA rule 13200.11
Doscher’s first statement of claim accused Respondents of retaliatory discharge, unjust
enrichment and breach of contract, but was amended to include securities fraud under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b–5 of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5.12 The arbitral
panel’s award was significantly less than the $15 million Doscher sought, and on January
20, 2015, Doscher filed a 9 U.S.C. § 1013 petition following the panel’s award.14
Doscher filed his § 10 petition in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York and included two grounds for vacatur of the arbitral panel’s
award.15 First, under § 10(a)(3),16 Doscher claimed that the arbitral panel neglected to
ensure that documentary evidence was made available to him.17 Second, he claimed the
9

See generally Doscher v. Sea Port Grp. Sec., LLC, No. 15-CV-384 JMF, 2015 WL 4643159 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 5, 2015), vacated, 832 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. Aug. 11, 2016).
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See Doscher, 832 F.3d at 374.
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Doscher, LLC, No. 15-CV-384 JMF, 2015 WL 4643159, at * 1 (citing FINRA Rule 13200, available
at http://fmra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4203).
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Doscher, 832 F.3d at 374.

See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012) (“In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to
the arbitration--(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there
was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty
of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”).
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Doscher, 832 F.3d at 374-75.
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Id. at 375.

See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (2012) (stating that vacatur is appropriate “where the arbitrators were guilty of
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced”).
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arbitral panel violated FINRA Rule 13505 requiring the parties to cooperate in
discovery.18 FINRA Rule 13505 is a federal law; therefore, Doscher claimed that his
petition facially stated a federal question granting federal-question jurisdiction.19
Additionally, Doscher asserted that his § 10(b)20 claim automatically granted federalquestion jurisdiction.21
The District Court dismissed Doscher’s jurisdictional arguments.22 The court
maintained that no question of federal law was presented by violations of internal FINRA
rules.23 Furthermore, the court held that the Greenberg decision rejected reliance on a §
10(b)24 claim for jurisdiction.25 Consequently, the District Court dismissed Doscher’s
petition for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.26 Doscher later appealed to the Second
Circuit to contest both the ruling of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the
continuing validity of Greenberg.27
III.

Court’s Analysis
A. Doscher Presented No Facial Claim Regarding Manifest Disregard of Federal
Law.

The Second Circuit dismissed Doscher’s first jurisdictional argument concerning
the arbitral panel’s violation of federal FINRA rules.28 Although federal law imposes
obligations on self-regulatory organizations (SRO’s) (including FINRA), the law imposes
no obligations on arbitral panels when applying those rules.29 Because Doscher’s claim
18

Doscher, 832 F.3d at 375.
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Id.

9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (2012) (“If an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the
award to be made has not expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators”).
20
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Doscher, 832 F.3d at 375.
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Id.
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Id.

See 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (2012) (stating that “if an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement
required the award to be made has not expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the
arbitrators”).
24
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Doscher, 832 F.3d at 375.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 375-76.
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Id. at 376.
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implicated the arbitral panel rather than FINRA, the asserted violation was too attenuated
to trigger federal-question jurisdiction on its own.30 Cementing the conclusion that
Doscher’s petition failed to present a facial claim regarding manifest disregard of federal
law was the Merrill Lynch v. Manning case.31 In Manning, the Supreme Court held that a
violation of an SRO rule grants federal question jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(a) in
two instances: (1) those asserting an Exchange Act cause of action; and (2) where the
Exchange Act was breached or another federal statute requirement was infringed.32
Importantly, the Exchange Act “imposes no duty to comply with FINRA rules either on
the arbitrators or non-SRO parties to arbitration,” disqualifying Doscher’s initial
jurisdictional claim.33
B. The Look Through Approach Applies to Both § 4 and § 10 of the FAA.
In Greenberg v. Bear Stearns, the Second Circuit rejected the look through
approach for § 10 petitions based exclusively on the holding of Westmoreland v. Findlay,
which denied the look through approach to § 4 petitions.34 Westmoreland held that the
“save for” clause35 in § 4 repudiated the “ouster theory,”36 displaying Congress’ intention
to preserve federal court jurisdiction despite the presence of an agreement to arbitrate.37
Furthermore, provisions lacking the “save for” clause had previously been interpreted to
exclude jurisdiction in favor of the greater federal interest of promoting arbitration.38
Greenberg maintained that:
30

Doscher, 832 F.3d at 376.

31

Id. at 377.

32

Id. (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562, 1569 (2016)).

33

Doscher, 832 F.3d at 377.

34

See Greenberg, 220 F.3d at 24 (holding that district courts have federal-question jurisdiction over § 10
petitions only if the petition states a substantial federal question on its face; essentially, a district court may
not “look through” the petition to determine if the underlying dispute that was subject to arbitration
involved substantial questions of federal law—the claim must state on its face that an arbitral panel
disregarded a federal law).
See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (“A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save
for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil action . . . for an order directing that
such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement” (emphasis added)).
35

See Doscher, 832 F.3d at 379 (mentioning that the “ouster theory” is a “common law principle that an
agreement to arbitrate would oust the federal courts of jurisdiction”).
36

37

Id. (citing Westmoreland Capital Corp. v. Findlay, 100 F.3d 263, 268 (2d Cir. 1996), abrogated by
Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 129 S. Ct. 1262, 173 L. Ed. 2d 206 (2009)).
38

See Doscher, 832 F.3d at 379 (quoting Westmoreland, 100 F.3d at 268).
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As with a motion under § 4, the only federal rights that a motion under §
10 necessarily implicates are those created by the FAA itself, which rights
do not give rise to federal question jurisdiction. In both contexts, there is
no necessary link between the requested relief and the character of the
underlying dispute.39
Crucially, Vaden holds that “[a] federal court may ‘look through’ a § 4 petition to
determine whether it is predicated on an action that ‘arises under’ federal law.”40 The
Westmoreland case was expressly overruled by Vaden, holding that the “save for” clause
of § 4 properly indicates a district court’s assumption of the absence of an arbitration
agreement, requiring the determination of whether jurisdiction exists over the
“substantive conflict between the parties.”41 The central issue in Vaden was whether a § 4
petition to compel arbitration established federal question jurisdiction by seeking to
enforce a state law arbitration obligation.42 The question was whether federal question
jurisdiction exists where the underlying dispute raises a federal question, but the § 4
petition does not.43 Under Vaden, this jurisdictional determination requires a court to
examine the “underlying dispute,” despite the fact that the purpose of § 4 petitions to
compel arbitration is to have arbitrators resolve the merits, rather than the courts.44
C. Greenberg is Inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s Ruling in Vaden.
Despite lacking the “save for” language of § 4, the Second Circuit reasoned that §
10 is to be construed in favor of the look through approach because of (1) the
jurisdictional context of Vaden and (2) the practical consequences of barring the approach
to only one section.45 In Vaden, the basis for jurisdiction was 28 U.S.C. § 1331 federal
question jurisdiction, as it was in Doscher.46 Furthermore, the federal question, required
by § 1331, “arose from the underlying dispute, not the face of the petition” in Vaden.47
Additionally, the Second Circuit argued that a federal court’s jurisdiction cannot differ

39

See Greenberg, 220 F.3d at 26.

40

Doscher, 832 F.3d at 380 (quoting Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 62 (2009)).

41

Vaden, 556 U.S. at 62.

42

Id. at 49.

43

Id.

44

Id. at 62-63.

45

Doscher, 832 F.3d at 382-83.

46

Id. at 383.

47

Id.
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between § 4 and other sections considering that “§ 4 of the FAA does not enlarge federalcourt jurisdiction.”48
The Second Circuit identified a “tension” between the two controlling principles
of Vaden: first, the emphasis on the text of § 4 when concluding a court has federalquestion jurisdiction over the underlying dispute, and second, that the provisions of the
FAA do not affect a federal court’s jurisdiction.49 If the first point of emphasis leads to
the conclusion that the absence of the “save for” clause in § 10 justifies the Greenberg
ruling, then § 4 is used as an expansion of jurisdiction, which is forbidden by Vaden.50
Therefore, the Second Circuit reasoned that Greenberg must be rejected in favor of
allowing the jurisdictional inquiry to extend to the underlying dispute.51 Furthermore, the
court claimed that the “save for” clause52 is construed to define the availability of the
remedy instead of jurisdiction, due to Congress’ intent to broadly compel arbitration in §
4’s authorization of arbitration in “every dispute over which Title 28 confers
jurisdiction.”53 The Second Circuit reasoned that the FAA’s other sections establish their
authorizing language according to geography and not the jurisdiction of the issuing
court.54
The Second Circuit cited Congress’ intent to “create a body of federal substantive
law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the
Act” when construing Vaden’s support of the look through approach in § 4 to § 10.55
Additionally, the FAA constrains the role of courts where arbitration agreements exist;
however, the Second Circuit maintains that courts still have an ability to enforce
legislative remedies for arbitral disputes in which they would otherwise have
jurisdiction.56
Finally, the Second Circuit held that a broader application of the look through
approach “prevents absurd and illogical discrepancies.”57 The “face-of-the-petition”
48

Doscher, 832 F.3d at 383 (quoting Vaden, 556 U.S. at 66).

49

Id. at 384.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).

53

Doscher, 832 F.3d at 384.

54

Id. at 384-85 (asserting that the FAA section compelling attendance of witnesses (9 U.S.C. § 7) uses a
“geographical hook” by limiting its authorization to district courts for the district in which arbitrators sit
and where an award was granted).
55

Id. at 385 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983))
(emphasis added).
56

Doscher, 832 F.3d at 386 (citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 25 n.32).

57

Id.
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approach identified in Vaden resulted in the failure to accommodate § 4 petitioners with
the ability to remove a suit to federal court.58 Importantly, enforcement was not the only
goal of Congress in passing the FAA according to the court.59 The Second Circuit
maintained that Congress intended a “substantive-albeit limited-review” of arbitration
awards by enacting rules for vacatur and modification.60 The court cautioned that under a
face-of-the-petition approach, lawyers are encouraged to preserve access to federal courts
for potential disputes arising in arbitration by filing parallel federal suits.61 This perverse
incentive flies in the face of Congress’ intent to promote arbitration as an efficient
alternative to litigation in the context of § 4 petitions, but extends to § 10 petitions
according to the Second Circuit.62
Doscher holds that courts faced with § 10 petitions may “look through the petition
to the underlying dispute, applying to it the ordinary rules of federal-question jurisdiction
and the principles laid out by the majority in Vaden,” by adopting the following rules:
first, where a district court has jurisdiction over the underlying dispute under § 1331
standards, federal-question jurisdiction exists for an FAA petition; second, the § 4 “save
for” clause displays congressional authorization for compulsory arbitration in any district
court possessing jurisdiction; and third, the FAA’s other sections do not affect the
jurisdictional inquiry.63
IV.

SIGNIFICANCE

The Second Circuit’s holding in Doscher effectively expands the appealability of
arbitration decisions whose petitions may not facially implicate federal rules.64 While
adopting the look through approach for § 4 motions to compel arbitration ensures the
enforceability of arbitral agreements,65 allowing the same approach to § 10 vacatur
petitions has the opposite effect. The adoption of the look through approach removes a
barrier to federal question jurisdiction in § 10 proceedings, making it easier for federal
courts to assess the legitimacy and procedure of arbitral awards. Section 2 of the FAA

58

Doscher, 832 F.3d at 386.

Id. at 387 (asserting that if enforcement were Congress’ only goal, it would only have passed § 2 and §
3).
59

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Doscher, 832 F.3d at 388.

64

Id. at 388-89.

65

See generally Vaden, 556 U.S. at 65.
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references the validity, irrevocability, and enforcement of arbitral agreements.66 Vaden’s
effective expansion of jurisdiction for § 4 motions to compel enhances the validity,
irrevocability, and enforcement of agreements to arbitrate by increasing the probability
that a federal court hears motions to compel arbitration.67 However, the “irrevocability”
of arbitration agreements established by § 2 comes into question where courts’
jurisdiction to rule on vacatur petitions is expanded. Additionally, the limited statutory
grounds for vacatur in § 10 indicate by their limited number a congressional policy
favoring enforcement of arbitral awards,68 which may be frustrated by an expansion of
federal question jurisdiction with the new application of the look through approach.
Nevertheless, the drafters of the FAA provided a remedy to the dangers of both
fraud and prejudiced proceedings in arbitral proceedings through § 10. Extending the
look through approach to § 10 petitions strengthens the § 10 remedy in allowing a deeper
consideration of the merits of a dispute. Courts have consistently lost jurisdiction over
threshold inquiries of arbitration to the arbitrators themselves.69 The Doscher decision
seems to be a response to that trend by tightening the Second Circuit’s grasp over the
appealability of arbitral decisions Today, federal courts in the Second Circuit may
penetrate deep into the record to salvage federal question jurisdiction. Practitioners in the
Second Circuit must understand that arbitral awards are now susceptible to an expanded
review and potential interference from courts. It is unlikely that parties may contract out
of the look through approach in their arbitral clauses, considering that the Supreme Court
has held that private parties may not contractually impose their own standards on courts
reviewing arbitration awards.70 However, this prohibition exists only in reference to the
text of the FAA, which makes no specific mention of the look-through approach.71
V.

CRITIQUE

The Third Circuit recently tried a case significantly similar to Doscher, but with
an irreconcilable holding.72 In Goldman v. Citigroup, a FINRA arbitration proceeding
See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“[A]n agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”).
66

67

See generally Vaden, 556 U.S. at 65.

68

See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 90 (7th ed.
2015).
69

See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (U.S. 1995) (holding that jurisdictional claims
may be sent to the arbitrator by contract); see also Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064
(U.S. 2013) (holding that questions of class arbitrability are decided by the arbitrator).
70

See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (U.S. 2008) (holding that §9-11 of the FAA are
exclusive and cannot be expanded through contractual agreement).
71

Id.

72

See Goldman, 834 F.3d at 242.
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alleged securities fraud against Citigroup under the Securities Exchange Act.73 The
arbitral panel dismissed the Plaintiffs’ claims after an initial mediation failed.74 Plaintiffs
filed a § 10 motion to vacate the arbitration award and asserted that the arbitral panel
exhibited partiality in favor of defendants.75 The district court granted dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction, which became the issue on appeal.76
Citing Moses H. Cone, the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the
FAA provides no federal cause of action establishing federal question jurisdiction, but
instead requires an “independent basis” for federal jurisdiction.77 The Third Circuit
previously held in the Coastal General case that to succeed in a § 10 motion to vacate,
“[n]ot only must federal jurisdiction exist aside from the Arbitration Act, but the
independent basis must appear on the face of the complaint.”78 To overcome Coastal
General’s rejection of the look through approach for § 10 vacatur motions, the plaintiffs
pointed to Vaden as an intervening change in the law.79 The Third Circuit admitted that
there “may be some superficial appeal to treating a § 10 motion to vacate an arbitration
award in the same manner as a § 4 motion,” but maintained that “a close reading of
Vaden” and the FAA forecloses the argument.”80
According to the Third Circuit, Vaden clearly upheld the well-pleaded complaint
rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in application to the FAA as a whole. 81 Importantly, the court
noted that Vaden’s relaxation of the well-pleaded complaint rule for § 4 petitions was
based on the unique text of § 4’s “save for” clause.82 Section 10 lacks the “save for”
73

Goldman, 834 F.3d at 242.

74

Id. (noting that allegations of spying during the confidential mediation were made against Citigroup by
the Goldmans).
Id. (noting that the Goldmans claimed that the “FINRA arbitration panel behaved improperly in that it
demanded ‘voluminous’ and irrelevant discovery from them, did not permit sufficient discovery of CGMI's
documents, exhibited partiality towards CGMI, and ‘refused to resign’ at the Goldmans' request”).
75

76

Id. (noting that the district court ruled that the FAA does not create federal subject matter jurisdiction on
its own, and that federal question jurisdiction, independent of the FAA, would be required with an absence
of diverse parties in this case).
77

Id. at 250 (citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 25 n.32).

78

Goldman, 834 F.3d at 252 (citing Virgin Islands Hous. Auth. v. Coastal Gen. Const. Servs. Corp., 27
F.3d 911 (3d Cir. 1994)).
Id. (referencing the Plaintiffs’ argument that Vaden’s validation of the look through approach should be
applied to § 10 vacatur motions).
79

80

Id.

See id. at 252-53 (noting that under the well-pleaded complaint rule, “a suit ‘arises under’ federal law
‘only when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon [federal law]”).
81

82

Id. at 253 (quoting Vaden, 556 U.S. at 62) (“[t]he text of § 4 drives our conclusion that a federal court
should determine its jurisdiction by ‘looking through’ a § 4 petition to the parties' underlying substantive
controversy”).
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clause of § 4, excluding Vaden’s textual consideration from application to § 10.83
Furthermore, Vaden’s identification of “practical consequences” (the incentive to file a
parallel suit prior to arbitration to preserve federal jurisdiction) does not apply to § 10
because the section makes “no reference to the subject matter of the dispute” in its
vacatur provision.84 In essence, § 10 makes no demand for a court to consider whether it
has jurisdiction over the “subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between
the parties” as referenced in § 4, according to the Third Circuit.85
The Third Circuit’s position is buttressed by the Seventh Circuit’s ruling, prior to
Vaden, that “there was ‘no reason to artificially import the language’ of § 4 into § 10.”86
The Seventh Circuit determined that Congress intended to treat motions to compel and
motions to vacate differently because “[t]he central federal interest was enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate, not review of arbitration decisions.”87 This interest rationalizes
granting jurisdiction to courts otherwise having jurisdiction only in the enforcement of
arbitral clauses. However, once the arbitral agreement is enforced, “there exists no
compelling need for the federal courts to be involved, unless a federal question is actually
at issue.”88
Examining Vaden’s “practical consequences” argument for a second time, the
Third Circuit praises the Seventh Circuit’s policy rationale for “mesh[ing] exactly” with
Vaden.89 Extending the look through approach to § 4 efficiently compels arbitration and
dis-incentivizes filing preliminary federal suits; but this approach is inapplicable to § 10
petitions challenging the “procedural propriety of the arbitration,” wholly unrelated to the
underlying subject matter of the issue.90 Goldman forbids the look through approach for §
10 motions to vacate, instead opting for the traditional well-pleaded complaint rule for
the establishment of federal question jurisdiction. 91
Goldman potently criticizes the Second Circuit’s decision in Doscher. Critical to
both opinions is the “save for” clause of § 4. The Second Circuit’s argument for
83

Goldman, 834 F.3d at 253.

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

Id. at 254 (citing Kasap v. Folger Nolan Fleming & Douglas, Inc., 166 F.3d 1243, 1247 (D.C. Cir.
1999)).
87

Id. (citing Minor v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 94 F.3d 1103, 1107 (7th Cir. 1996).

88

Goldman, 834 F.3d at 254 (citing Minor, 94 F.3d at 1107).

89

Id.

90

Id.

See id. at 255 (holding that “the motion to vacate must, on its face, “necessarily raise a stated federal
issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any
congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities”).
91
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extension of the look through approach, despite the absence of the “save for” clause in §
10, seems to disqualify the Third Circuit’s assertion that the absence of the clause forbids
the extension of the look through approach. Because the FAA cannot expand jurisdiction
according to Vaden,92 the Second Circuit correctly assumes that the presence of the “save
for” clause in § 4 is not controlling in the prescription of the look through approach.
The Third Circuit’s reading of § 10 establishes that the underlying subject matter
of the dispute is not mentioned in the statutory grounds for vacatur.93 This creates a
presumption of congressional intent to keep courts from assessing the subject matter of a
dispute when making jurisdictional inquiries. However, the Second Circuit’s emphasis
that Congress’ intent with the FAA was to create federal law “applicable to any
arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act”94 competes with the Third Circuit’s
position if it is presumed that the look through approach should itself apply broadly. The
Third Circuit’s position is at its strongest when referencing congressional intent to
enforce arbitration agreements, rather than their review. Despite this point, it is unclear
from the express language of § 10 how far a court may look into a dispute for the purpose
of determining whether federal question jurisdiction exists.
Notably, in Hall Street v. Mattel, the Supreme Court declared that a limited
review of arbitration decisions is necessary to preserve the expediency and efficiency of
arbitration, distinct from its previous assertions that Congress’ intent was the enforcement
of arbitration agreements under the FAA.95 Neither purpose is served by the Second
Circuit’s insistence on penetrating deeper into records to salvage federal question
jurisdiction. Proceedings are lengthened where appeal provisions are relaxed, and the
expediency of arbitration proceedings vanishes with the threat of additional litigation.
Moreover, the enforceability of arbitral agreements comes into question where a lax
vacatur policy looms over arbitration awards. However, the look through approach
attempts to address the perverse incentive of filing parallel court proceedings with
arbitration to preserve federal question jurisdiction.96 Unfortunately, the look through
approach merely substitutes excess litigation after an award has been rendered in hopes
of avoiding parallel litigation at the outset of arbitration. The look through approach thus
fails to avoid the surplus litigation contemplated by the Second Circuit.

92

Doscher, 832 F.3d at 384.

93

See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012).

94

Doscher, 832 F.3d at 385.

95

See generally Hall St. Assocs, 552 U.S. 576 (U.S. 2008); but see Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 29 (holding
that “[t]he Arbitration Act calls for a summary and speedy disposition of motions or petitions to enforce
arbitration clauses”).
96

Doscher, 832 F.3d at 387.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court’s Vaden decision left unresolved questions regarding the
scope of the look through approach beyond § 4 petitions to compel arbitration. Doscher
results in a deeper focus on the underlying dispute for the determination of federal
question jurisdiction in § 10 vacatur petitions by rejecting a face-of-the-petition inquiry
for federal question jurisdiction. The Second Circuit now extends the look through
approach to § 10 petitions for vacatur in what has become a controversial interpretation
of Vaden. The Doscher decision is irreconcilable with the Third Circuit’s position in the
recent Goldman case. These differing holdings display a glaring need for clarification in
the wake of Vaden.
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